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INTRODUCTION

The field of mineral exploration and development has long
been one of high risk and tension. The tension in the industry
is attributable not only to the large number of contractual relationships but also to their complexity.
In attempting to come to grips with these issues typical to
mineral development, the courts over the years have devised
various legal fictions to put such issues in a legal framework
from which a resolution can be fashioned. 1 One of the oldest of
these legal fictions is the mining partnership. 2 Kentucky has
largely forgotten or even ignored this theory in recent decades.'
Nevertheless, the mining partnership theory is still sound and
affords a solid foundation for resolving some of the thorniest
issues which arise among joint owners of mineral properties and

* Partner, King, Deep & Branaman, Henderson, Kentucky; B.A., University of
Notre Dame, 1974; J.D., University of Kentucky, 1977.
2 H. WILLIAMS & C. MYERS, OIL & GAS LAW §§ 434-38 (1986).
Skillman v. Lachman, 23 Cal. 198 (1863) (the earliest U.S. case which recognizes
the law of mining partnerships). See generally 4 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING §§ 22.2722.47 (1982); 3 C. LINDLEY, LINDLEY ON MINES §§ 796-803 (3d ed. 1914); 1 D. FANNON &
F. MELLEN, KENTUCKY MINERAL LAW § T47.05 (D. Short & R. Thomas ed. 1986); 4
W.
SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS §§ 721-734 (1962); 4 D. VISH, COAL LAW &
REGULATION § 83.06[3] (1985); 2 H. WILLIAMS & C. MYERS, supra note 1, at § 435.
1 Stephens v. Allen, 237 S.W.2d 72 (Ky. 1951).
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third parties directly affected by the activities of those joint
owners. 4 The time has come to rediscover the theory and its
application in the context of modern mineral development.
I.

CHARACTERISTICS OF A MINING PARTNERSHIP

A mining partnership has been defined by the Kentucky
courts as: "an association of joint owners of mineral property
in which by express stipulation, or by implication deduced from
the acts of the parties, they unite arid agree to develop the
premises or operate the lease in order to extract the minerals." 5
This simple statement embodies the essential elements of the
mining partnership and its distinctive characteristics.
In examining the characteristics of a mining partnership, it
is best to begin by contrasting it with a common commercial
partnership. The Uniform Partnership Act defines a partnership
as "an association of two (2) or more persons to carry on as
co-owners a business for profit. ' 6 In comparing the two definitions, the mining partnership is distinguished from the commercial partnership by being limited to development of mineral
properties by joint owners.'
A mining partnership is a hybrid concept designed to facilitate the development of mineral properties in a commercially
reasonable manner.' As such, it is an effort by the courts to

See generally treatise authorities cited supra note 2.
Stephens, 237 S.W.2d at 74 (This case involved the consolidation of fourteen
suits brought against Allen, the trustee of a mining partnership, to remove him as the
managing partner. The court found that Allen had acted in good faith and refused the
request for his removal.).
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.175 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982) [hereinafter KRS
with all cites to Michie/Bobbs-Merrill.
Stephens, 237 S.W.2d at 74.
8 See C. LINDLEY, supra note 2, at § 796; Kahn v. Smelting Co., 102 U.S. 641,
645-46 (1880); Skillman, 23 Cal. at 206. See generally Brimmer, Mining Partnerships,
15 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 85, 86 (1969) ("A mining partnership has been described
as a cross between a general commercial partnership and a tenancy in common [Gilbert
v. Fontaine, 22 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1927)], as a species of limited partnership [Lindley,
supra note 2, at § 7961, as a partnership sub modo [Bissell v. Foss, 114 U.S. 252 (1885)],
and as a non trading partnership [Congdon v. Olds, 46 P. 261 (1896); Randall v.
Meredith, 13 S.W. 576 (1890); Childers v. Neely, 34 S.E. 828 (1899)], without which
successful mining would be attended with difficulties and embarrassment [Kahn, 102
U.S. 6411.").
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make it possible for joint owners to develop their property in a
sound and legitimate fashion.9 The concept balances the need to
develop jointly owned property with the rights of both the joint
owners and third parties affected by the activities of the venture. 10 This need to balance the rights and duties of the joint
owners and others in the context of promoting development of
mineral properties is still the essence of this body of law."
The earliest case recognizing the concept of mining partnerships is Skillman v. Lachman.' 2 That case pointed directly to the
single most distinctive feature of mining partnerships, i.e., that
there is no delectus personae, or right to choose one's partners. 3
This is a concept completely alien to commercial partnerships,
which are deemed dissolved by the withdrawal or death of a
general partner. 4 The need for such a distinction is clear. Unlike
a factory, service profession, or grocery store, an oil well or a
coal mine cannot sensibly be shut down and closed each time a
joint owner wants to withdraw from the venture. The abuses
that would be generated by a contrary rule are easily demonstrated hypothetically. If three persons jointly owned a producing oil well, one of the three could force the well to be plugged
and the lease which created the leasehold estate terminated,
simply by conveying his interest to a fourth party. The withdrawing partner would then be free to seek a new lease to the
same property by himself. As a result, he would have used the
investment capital of his partners to prospect for oil, and then
once production was established, effectively denied them the
opportunity to recoup that investment. The capital outlay necessary for most mining ventures is so heavily front-loaded that
it is inherently unfair to allow or force the venture's termination
before affording a legitimate opportunity to recoup the investment.
' See Kahn, 102 U.S. at 645-46. See generally LINDLEY, supra note 2, at § 796;
Sullivan and Anderson, Co-ownership of Mining Properties and Mining Partnerships,4
AM. L. OF MINING § 22.28 (1982).
o See supra notes 8 and 9.
Id.
12 23 Cal. 198 (1863).
13

Id.

KRS § 362.290 (1972) ("The dissolution of a partnership is the change in the
relation of any partners caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying
on as distinguished from the winding up of the business.").
14
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The same inherent unfairness can be demonstrated as to
creditors. A person who has provided materials or services to
the mining venture could easily have his legitimate claim defeated
if one of the partners withdrew and the mineral property was
not liquidated at a price sufficient to satisfy his claim. This
scenario would obviously work an injustice on the supplier, but
it would also deter creditors from extending credit to mining
ventures, even on a short term basis. When the high cost of
such ventures is borne in mind, such a chilling of credit would
significantly reduce natural resource exploration and development.
The flip side is that the non-operating members of the mining
partnership must have some personal protection from the unauthorized actions of their partners or co-venturers. The normal
commercial partnership lacks this trait, because the partners are
deemed jointly and severally liable for all expenses chargeable
to the partnership." This is particularly significant since general
partners are liable both for the wrongful acts of each other, if
done in the ordinary course of business,' 6 and for a breach of
trust by a partner done within the scope of his apparent au7
thority.
The courts have met this problem by providing that no
partner has the power to bind the mining partnership without

-5 KRS § 362.220 (1972) ("All partners are liable: (1) Jointly and severally for
everything chargeable to the partnership under KRS § 362.210 and § 362.215. (2) Jointly
for all other debts and obligations of the partnership; but any partner may enter into a
separate obligation to perform a partnership contract.").
16

When, by any wrongful act or ommission of any partner acting in the
ordinary course of business of the partnership or with the authority of his
copartners, loss or injury is caused to any person, not being a partner in
the partnership, or any penalty is incurred, the partnership is liable therefore to the same extent as the partner so acting or omitting to act.
KRS § 362.210 (1972).
17

The partnership is bound to make good the loss:
(1) Where one partner acting within the scope of his apparent authority
receives money or property of a third person and misapplies it; and
(2) Where the partnership, in the course of its business, receives money
or property of a third person and the money or property so received is
misapplied by any partner while it is in the custody of the partnership.
KRS § 362.215 (1972).
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special or necessary authority.' 8 This particular characteristic is
most significant to third parties that deal with a mining partnership. Potential creditors must be aware of the distinction and
should make case by case decisions as to whether an expenditure
is "necessary" or authorized by the remaining partners. Creditors, however, are afforded an additional protection by this rule:
if the expenditure falls within the special or necessary authority
of the contracting party, partner liability extends beyond the
mining property to their personal assets. 19
The partner liability aspect of mining partnerships has been
the key source of tension, particularly in the more recent decisions. 20 The mineral development business has evolved in recent
years into a much bigger and more complex field. Oil wells are
rarely owned by one or by even a very few number of individuals. It is very common for an oil well to be owned by a large
group of investors, most of whom have very little, if any,
expertise in the field and are simply contributing capital to the
venture. Quite commonly, the investors have designated or consented to the designation of one person as operator. In many
cases, these investors have prepaid their proportionate share of
the drilling and/or completion expenses on a turn-key basis.
Holding such limited investors personally liable to creditors for
cost overruns is obviously undesirable. The consequence has been
a series of cases that have dealt with the concept of mining
partnerships in a loose and inconsistent manner.2 1
The cavalier manner in which some courts have handled this
issue is best illustrated by a review of the decisions of the Texas
courts. In Berchelmann v. Western Co. 2 2 the court was confronted with a materialman's lien foreclosure action against joint

11See, e.g.,

Bentley v. Brossard, 94 P. 736 (Utah 1908) (The members or managers

of a mining partnership are limited to the performance of such acts in the name of the
partnership as may be necessary to the transaction of its business, or are usual in like
concerns, unless there is an express agreement to the contrary known to the party dealing
with the manager or member.).
Id. at 743-44.
o See, e.g., Ayco Dev. Corp. v. G.E.T. Serv. Co., 616 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. 1981);
Russell and E.D.S. Energy Dev. Serv., Inc. v. French & Assoc., Inc., 709 S.W.2d 312
(Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
2, See infra notes 22-45 and accompanying text.
363 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).

JOURNAL OF MnERAL LAW AND POLICY

[VoL.

2:319

owners with whom the supplier had not contracted directly. The
joint owners had entered into a typical agreement designating
one of them as the operator for the purpose of drilling and
operating the well on a day to day basis. 23 The operator, in turn,
would bill the joint owners for their pro-rata share of the expenses.24 As is often the case, the operator contracted with a
materialman and then failed to pay the account. 25 The court
found that a mining partnership did not exist because one of
the elements--joint operation--was missing. 26 The court's finding
was premised on the fact that the operating agreement had
27
specifically designated the joint owners as "non-operators.''
This result was confirmed in 1981 in Ayco Development
Corp. v. G.E.T. Service. Co. 28 Once again, the Texas court
refused to allow a materialman to recover from the investors
and went further, holding that visits to the mining or drilling
site do not alone, as a matter of law, constitute proof of joint
control.2 9
One Texas court, however, took a different view in Russell
and E.D.S. Energy Dev. Services, Inc. v. French & Assoc., Inc. 0
In this case, a suit by the operator to recover unpaid expenses
from his investors was countered with a fraud and securities
violation counterclaim. 3 The written agreement between the parties had designated them as joint venturers and provided that
each joint owner would have one vote in the management of the
company.3 2 This same agreement also designated the operator as
had been done in the two earlier cases.33 Texas law creates a

23

Id.

1,Id. at 876.
25 Id.
26 Id.
I Berchelmann, 363 S.W.2d at 876-77.
- 616 S.W.2d 184 (1981) (Investors who were wholly excluded from participation
in drilling, operation and control of oil wells, but who were permitted to visit the mining
site, were not joint venturers and therefore could not be held liable along with defendant
contractor in this suit to recover for supplies and services furnished to an independant
contractor.).
Id. at 186.
30 709 S.W.2d 312 (Tex Ct. App. 1986).
Id. at 314.
Id. at 315.
3 Ayco Dev. Corp., 616 S.W.2d at 186; State v. Harrington, 407 S.W.2d 467
(Tex. 1966).

1INING
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broad exemption from its Blue Sky Laws for joint ventures.3 4
The court seized upon the language in the agreement to construe
this particular arrangement as a mining partnership, thereby
exempting the operator from the Blue Sky Laws.35 The logic of
the court was that joint operation was shown by virtue of the
ability of the joint owners through their voting rights to replace
the operator.3 6 This is a distinction without a difference.
There should be no question that a majority of the joint
owners always has the right to replace operators, or for that
matter, direct that the operator pursue a particular course of
action.3 7 This is clearly the rule in Kentucky,38 and has been held
the rule in other jurisdictions as well. 3 9 Consequently, the Texas
court inappropriately relied on the designation of an operator in
holding that the association did not fall within the realm of a
mining partnership. Those "non-operators"''
had the right to
vote to change the operator just as they did in the later Russell
4
case.
The reasoning of the Texas court regarding materialmen's
claims was carried to an extreme in FrontierExploration Inc. v.
Blocker Exploration Co. 42 This case also was decided against the
creditors on the basis that the joint operations requirement was
missing.4 3 Of particular interest is the court's commentary defining what does not constitute a joint operation:
Such commonly accepted rights of non-operators as the right
to receive reports and statements, to take in kind, to advance
limited funds or services or equipment, or to have access to
the site, to inspect the books, or the right to withhold approval

TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN.

§ 581-1

(Vernon 1986).

11Russell, 709 S.W.2d at 315.
36 Id.

17 Stephens, 237 S.W.2d at 72.
38 Id.

19 See, e.g., Blackmarr v. Williamson, 50 S.E. 254 (W. Va. 1905) (When members
of a mining partnership cannot agree in management, those having a majority interest
control all things necessary and proper for its operation.).
-oThe investors designated who would be the "operator" via the operating agreement in Ayco Dev. Corp., 616 S.W.2d at 186 and Harrington, 407 S.W.2d at 477.
4
709 S.W.2d at 315.
709 P.2d 39 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
Id. at 40.
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of specified expenditures, do not, by themselves rise to the
level of such active participation or control of the operation
so as to constitute 'joint operations."'
The reader with a critical eye and logical mind would quite
rightly wonder what else would be necessary to meet the joint
operation requirement. The thrust of the case is that only the
actual operator, or contracting party, is personally liable to the
materialman. 45 The assertion that there was not enough participation by the other owners to constitute joint operations is a
legal conclusion tailored to fit a desired result.
The message imparted by this line of cases is simply that the
courts are ill at ease with the personal liability aspect of mining
partnerships, particularly when applied to persons whose only
real connection to the operation is a captial contribution. 6 This
concern, while understandable, is not logically dealt with by the
Texas courts. The proper test is whether the joint owner, through
some contribution to the operation and by agreement, is to share
in the benefits to be derived from the venture. 47 The courts
should recognize that the person who supplies the capital is no
less involved in the operation than the individual who physically
operates the lease since nothing will happen without a sufficient
48
capital base.
A better position than that reached by the Texas courts and
one more consistent with the reasons giving rise to the theory
of the mining partnership, is the one adopted by the Arkansas
court in Spangler v. Comer Lumber & Supply Co. 49 This case
squarely presented the issue of whether investors would be personally liable when their investment had been made on a turnkey basis.50 The court held that advancing the necessary capital,

'" Id. at 42.
45 Id.

See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
, See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
Long Island Lighting Co. v. Bokum Resources Corp., 40 Bankr. 274 (Bankr.
D.N.M. 1983) (Under New Mexico law, an agreement to purchase goods or services in
a mining operation does not qualify as an "ownership" interest for purposes of a mining
partnership.).
,9439 S.W.2d 792 (1969) (Evidence in this case supported the finding that defendants were joint venturers with the well driller and were thus liable for the oil well drilling
supplies furnished by the plaintiffs.).
50 Id.
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coupled with investor entitlement to progress reports, met the
found the
joint operations requirement. 5 Accordingly, the court
52
non-operating investor liable as a mining partner.
While no reported Kentucky case presents this exact issue,
past decisions indicate that the Kentucky courts would follow
the Arkansas approach. The key case, Stephens v. Allen,53 merits
a close reading. In defining a mining partnership, the court
avoided the use of the specific term "joint operations," and
instead stated that the joint owners must have united and agreed
by express stipulation or by implication to develop the premises
or operate the lease in order to extract minerals.5 4 The court
impliedly acknowledged that the joint owners can divide among
themselves the functional elements of the venture, such as capital
contribution and management." The Kentucky court correctly
recognized that the real issue is whether the joint owners will
reap the benefits from the venture and be unjustly enriched if
56
the expenses are not paid.
Some doubt could be cast on the conclusion drawn from
57
Stephens by an earlier decision in Weir v. Jarecki Mfg. Co.
where the court refused to enforce a materialman's lien against
a non-contracting joint owner. However, Weir has been directly
criticized and is probably no longer good law. 58 In Campbell &
Summerhays, Inc. v. Greene, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
enforced a materialman's lien against a landlord even though
the debt was incurred as a result of an improvement created by
11Id. at
52

796.

Id.

11 237 S.W.2d 72 (Ky. 1951).
Id. at 74.
55 Id.

'"

56

Id.

51 72 S.W.2d 450 (1933).
58 381 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Ky.
1964) (The court stated that the Weir decision was
unsound, particularly concerning the significance of recording to validate a contract of
sale. In Weir, where a contract for the sale of an undivided interest in an oil and gas
lease required the vendee to drill certain wells, it was held that the persons who furnished
labor and materials could not enforce a lien against the vendor. Importance was attached
to the fact that the "recorded" contract of sale contained a provision that the wells
should be drilled without expense to the vendor. The Campbell court felt that mechanic's
lien statutes should be construed liberally to protect those who furnish labor and
materials.).
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a tenant.5 9 The basis of the decision was that the lease agreement
required the tenant to construct the improvement therefore, the
landlord would be unjustly enriched if it was not required to
pay the debt. 6° The unjust enrichment logic applied in Campbell
is equally applicable to investors in mineral properties.
The real issue which courts should address is whether and to
what extent the non-operator should be responsible for the partnership debt beyond the value of the partnership property. While
it must be conceded that extending liability beyond partnership
assets may have a chilling effect on investment and may, particularly where an operator has misappropriated the funds, cause
a harsh result, there is a simple alternative for investors. Investors who wish to own and develop mineral properties jointly,
and at the same time be insulated from liability, should simply
comply with the Uniform Limited Partnership Act. 6' The requirements imposed by statute for formation of the limited
partnership are hardly onerous.6 2 There is only one arguably
burdensome limitation. To avoid personal liability for the debts
of the enterprise, a limited partner may not take part in the
control of the business. 63 This requirement fits neatly with the
joint operations requirement of mining partnerships. Creditors
are still treated fairly because they can look to the general
partner with whom they deal to satisfy their claims. 4
The more difficult question is to what extent the non-operator should be liable under the mining partnership structure. It
is hardly just to impose liability jointly and severally if the

59 Id.
60Id.

KRS § 362.420 (Supp. 1986).
See id.
61 KRS § 362.470 (Supp. 1986) ("A limited partner shall not be liable as a general
partner unless, in addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner,
he takes part in the control of the business.").
- KRS § 362.490 (1972). If a limited partner does deal with a creditor, the limited
partner may be personally liable because he or she is participating in the control of the
business. KRS § 362.470 (1972). Also, creditors may not even be aware of the existence
of the limited partners because "the surname of a limited partner Icannot] appear in
the partnership name ....
.. KRS § 362.450 (1972). In general, creditors are treated
fairly because they have no reasonable expectation that a limited partner is personally
liable for the debts of the enterprise under the structure of a properly run limited
partnership.
6,

62
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parties never intended that the inactive joint owners would be
responsible beyond their proportionate share of their investment.
The non-operator does not share in the profits except to the
extent of his ownership interest. 6 Furthermore, the typical supplier understands that each owner participates in profits and
losses on a set basis and is arguably on constructive notice of
the intent to so limit liability by the filing of an assignment
setting forth each owner's interest. 66 The sound position is to
make the non-operator owner severally liable. 67
II.

ELEMENTS OF A MINING PARTNERSHIP

Mining partnerships are rarely the subject of written partnership agreements beyond what are known as operating agreements. 68 These agreements define the rights and obligations among
the parties to the venture but do not address the rights of third
parties as against the venture. 69 As a result, litigation is often

generated by third-party claimants whose first hurdle is to prove
the existence of a mining partnership. The cases have generally
recognized three elements as essential to a finding that a mining
partnership exists: joint ownership, an agreement for the sharing
of profits and losses, and conduct demonstrating cooperation in
70
the operation of the project.

The requirement of joint ownership is the most easily resolved of the three. The litigation on this particular element is
limited and quite direct. The leading case is Long Island Lighting

65

The ownership interest is generally stated in the operating agreement. See infra

note 69.
Suppliers normally make no effort to research title prior to advancing credit
because they do not anticipate non-payment. Suppliers are aware that most oil wells are
drilled with advance funding from non-operator investors.
61 This would not infringe on the supplier's ability to look to the operator, with
whom he contracted directly, for payment of the balance.
61 No express agreement is necessary for the creation of a mining partnership. See,
e.g., Munsey v. Mills & Garrity, 283 S.W. 754 (Tex. 1926); Bentley v. Brossard, 94 P.
736 (Utah 1908). A mining partnership can be created by formal agreement or by
operation of law from the conduct of the parties. 4 American Law of Mining § 22.30
(1982).
69 See Mud Control Laboratories v. Covey, 269 P.2d 854 (Utah 1954) (parties are
not bound by an agreement between mining partners).
70 Long Island
Lighting Co. v. Bokum Resources Corp., 40 Bankr. 274, 288
(Bankr. D.N.M. 1983); Treat v. Murdock, 65 P.2d 881, 884 (Cal. 1937).

JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW AND POLICY

[VOL. 2:319

Co. v. Bokum Resources Corp.71 That case represented an effort
to characterize a contractual relationship between a uranium
mining company and an electrical power supplier as a mining
partnership. 72 The contract between the two companies provided
for the power company to purchase five million pounds of a
uranium product at a set price. 73 In addition, $7.5 million was
put in escrow for development of the proposed uranium mine,
to be disbursed only on the approval of both parties. 74 The
money put up by the power company was to be repaid by
crediting $3 per pound on the price of uranium as purchases
were made. 75 Repayment was not conditional on production.
The court held that no mining partnership existed because the
element of joint ownership did not exist. 76 This opinion is sound,
since there was nothing in the relationship between the two
companies that vested any actual ownership interest in the power
company, although the court did recognize that an equitable
77
interest would constitute joint ownership.
Long Island Lighting Co. presents an interesting fact pattern
on the issue of whether there was sufficient joint operation and
profit sharing, but those issues were not reached by the court.
A debtor-creditor relationship does not constitute joint ownership. 78 Similarly, a security interest in a leasehold estate has been
held insufficient joint ownership to treat the holder of the security interest as a mining partner. In Smith v. Rampy, 79 the
leading case on this issue, a joint interest in oil and gas leases
had been acquired for the purpose of securing a personal guaranty on a bank loan, the proceeds from which were used to drill
the well. 0 The agreement between the two alleged partners called
for the guarantor to pay $15,000 for the interest in the well once
it was placed into production. 8' The court's finding that there
71

40 Bankr. 274 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1983).

72 Id.

71 Id. at 277-78.
74 Id. at 278.
75

Id.

Id. at 292.
7 Long Island Lighting Co., 40 Bankr. at 288.

76

78 Id.

79 Smith v. Rampy, 198 S.W. 592, 596 (Tex. Ct. App. 1946).
Id. at 549.
Id. at 595.
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was no evidence of joint ownership did not receive much analysis8 2
and is subject to criticism. The key to the court's decision
appears to have been the agreement between the alleged partners
that Smith, the guarantor, would not be responsible for any of
the costs of exploration." It is difficult to agree with the court
that there was no joint ownership in light of the fact that Smith
would share in the profits of the enterprise. In actuality, the
court treated Smith as a limited partner on the theory that the
guaranty agreement constituted his cash contribution and he
should not be liable beyond that investment. In this context, the
court's decision seems more reasonable in that Smith had not
participated in the operation of the well to a sufficient extent to
84
justify a finding of joint operation.
In the author's opinion, the rationale in Smith v. Rampy is
unsound. Smith was clearly a joint owner since, in the event of
production, he would have been entitled to share in the proceeds
of such production. The finding that he did not jointly operate
the lease begs the point. By guarantying the bank loan, which
assured the funds to initiate the drilling, the guarantor was
making a significant contribution to the operation of the venture.
If the court is saying this was not a sufficient contribution, it is
ignoring the realities of how mineral development is funded; if
the court is saying that joint operation means that each alleged
partner must actively participate in the management of the well
on a day-to-day basis, it is ignoring the realities of the oil
business.
The Smith decision should not have been grounded on either
joint ownership or joint operation, but rather on the lack of an
agreement to share in the profits and losses. Smith was only
entitled to share in the profits and losses if he paid $15,000
when the well was placed into production. He had the right,
then, to elect not to share in the profits, by simply declining to
purchase the interest. When this element is injected into the case,
Smith's present interest is seen as the parties intended it: a
security agreement to secure the guaranty and an option to

S2

Id. at 596.

83

Id.

m* Id.
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purchase a leasehold interest. When examined in this light the
decision makes sense, but only because ownership is equated
with an entitlement to a share in the profits.
The finding in Smith 5 of no joint operation could prove to
be a dangerous precedent. The evidence was that Smith had been
on the site when the well was brought in,8 6 consulted with the
on-site geologist,8 7 examined the core samples,18 and directed the
acquistion of some pipe.8 9 If these activities do not establish
joint operation, then very few mining partnerships will actually
exist since many investors only contribute funds to the drilling
venture and never visit the premises, let alone actively engage in
the operation of the well.
The best way to resolve the joint operation issue is through
the concept of unjust enrichment. The question remains as to
how much an investor must do to be considered a "joint operator." If the individual has contributed in some way with the
understanding that exploration or development will be undertaken, then he or she should be held as engaged in joint operations. The reason is simply that the investor has designated or
authorized someone to undertake operations on his behalf from
which he will derive a benefit. To allow an investor to avoid
payment for his share of those expenses would amount to unjust
enrichment.
The analysis advocated regarding the joint ownership issue
raises a question of whether lessors or owners of overriding
royalty interests could be considered members of the mining
partnership. The query is answered in the negative by reference
to the third element of mining partnerships, an agreement for
the sharing of profits and losses. ° Since neither royalty nor
overriding royalty interests are chargeable with the expenses of
the venture, 91 by definition lessors cannot be considered as sharing in the losses.

1, Smith,
88

198 S.W.2d at 595-96.
Id. at 595.
Id.
Id.

89

Id.

16
87

9o See supra note 70.
9' 1 M. SOLOCI-K, KENTUCKY MINERAiL LAW § 59.02 (D. Short & R. Thomas ed.
1986).
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The sharing of profits and losses element has been the subject
of conflict in the decisions. The earliest cases only required joint
ownership and joint operation. 92 The courts of Pennsylvania, 93
Kansas, 94 Oklahoma, 95 and Texas96 have held, however, that
there must be either an express or implied agreement for the
sharing of profits and losses. Other jurisdictions require that the
parties share in the profits and losses but do not require an
actual express agreement to that effect.97
The barely discernable trend appears to be that while the
sharing of profits and losses is essential, the requisite sharing
can be inferred from the circumstances. In Barrett v. Buchanan"
the Oklahoma court took a tentative step in this direction," but
the court appears to still require an agreement to share profits
and losses. I°° Similarly, a Utah court pointed out that an agreement to share the losses should not be considered a condition
precedent where the profits are actually shared since responsibility for the losses is an incident thereto. 0'° Finally, while the
opinion does little more than recognize a profit-sharing requireSee, e.g., Skillman v. Lachman, 23 Cal. 198 (1863).
Dunham v. Loverock, 27 A. 990 (Pa. 1893) (The parties had not created a
partnership due to the lack of an agreement, either express or implied, creating that
legal relationship. The parties were tenants in common, and their joint activity in
developing oil wells did not change that relationship into a partnership.).
9, Gilbert v. Fontaine, 22 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1927) [now 10th Cir.].
91Oklahoma Co. v. O'Neil, 440 P.2d 978 (Okla. 1968). See generally Sturm v.
Ulrich, 10 F.2d 9 (8th Cir. 1925) (In footnote 1, the court lists numerous cases from
every jurisdiction that had a part in the early development of mining partnership law.).
Munsey v. Mills and Garrity, 283 S.W. 754 (Tex. 1926).
See Childers v. Neeley, 34 S.E. 828 (W. Va. 1899) (The court took the general
view that whenever tenants in common work together in mining the land, a partnership
results. Given that, it is not surprising that the court did not require an express agreement
to share profits and losses.).
9 213 P. 734 (Okla. 1923).
Id. at 735 (citing Childers v. Neeley, 34 S.E. 828, the court suggested an
agreement may not be necessary.).
1w Id. (The court still requires a showing that the parties "agreed to develop the
property, each paying his part thereof.").
"I Mud Control Laboratories v. Coney, 269 P.2d 854 (Utah 1954); see also Bentley,
94 P. at 741 (citing LINDLEY, PARTNERSmS 30 (Ewell ed.)), where the court stated:
It is sometimes said that an obligation to share losses is an essential element
to the existence of a partnership. While an obligation to share losses is not
directly expressed in the agreement, still it has been quite generally held
that an agreement to share profits, nothing being said about losses, amounts
prima facie to an agreement to share losses also.
92
91
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02
ment, the tenor of Long Island Lighting Co.1
is that loss

sharing can be inferred from joint operations and an agreement
to share the profits on a pro-rata basis. 0 3 The conflict, however,
is a tempest in a teapot. If a joint owner contributes either time
or money to a mineral development he obviously intends to
share in the profits and losses and should be responsible to both
creditors and others involved in the venture with him.
III.

THE RIGHTS OF MINING PARTNERS AMONG THEMSELVES

The preceding discussion must be considered little more than
an intellectual exercise unless there is some significant use jfor
mining partnerships. The doctrine has utility in that it provides
a framework for the resolution of some otherwise very difficult
legal issues. The primary use of the doctrine is in the resolution
of disputes among the partners or arising out of their relation-

ship.
The most significant right which mining partners have among
themselves is the partners' lien. This lien was first recognized in
1°4
Kentucky in 1927 in Outram v. Paintsville National Bank.
This court held that each member of a mining partnership has
a lien upon the partnership property for payments of partnership
debts and monies advanced for partnership use. 05 This doctrine
essentially entitles the paying partner to a personal judgment
against the delinquent owner.
This theory provides a balance to the approach advocated
earlier in regard to third-party creditors. 1 When employed together, the two theories fairly provide all parties the opportunity
to be made whole. 0 7 A particular partner, whether the operator
or not, who has satisfied the partnership's creditors can look to

- Long Island Lighting Co. v. Bokum Resources Corp., 40 Bankr. 274 (Bankr.
D.N.M. 1983).
03

Id.

at 285-87.

294 S.W. 1067 (Ky. 1927).
,s Id. at 1068. Furthermore this lien is superior to the interest of a subsequent
mortgagee on a partner's interest.
See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
,0' The creditor is allowed to look to any of the partners to collect his debt. A
non-operator owner who voluntarily or involuntarily paid for expenses in excess of his
proportionate share can, in theory, look to the other partners-including non-operatormfor contribution.

1987]

MINING PARTNERSHIPS

his partners for contribution. The failing of the theory occurs,
obviously, if the delinquent partner files bankruptcy or is otherwise safe from execution. Even in these situations the existence
of the lien allows the partner to reduce his loss by subjecting
the delinquent partner's share of the partnership property to
sale.
The value of the partner's lien in this context is underscored
by the fact that in many cases the lien will be superior to
intervening lien claimants. In Paintsville National Bank, the
court found that the partner's lien was superior to a recorded
mortgage lien taken by a bank officer who knew the lease was
financed by assessments. 0 s Since virtually all modem oil projects
are similarly financed, this decision has the effect of holding the
partner's lien superior to all other claimants.' °9 The breadth of
this decision is arguably qualified by the decision in Young v.
Hill."0 In that case the mortgage was held superior based on the
existence in the mortgage of a clause allowing the partner's share
of expense to be deducted from the proceeds of production."'
Lending institutions would be well advised to incorporate into
their oil and gas mortgages a provision for the payment of
production expenses from monthly proceeds in the event of
default.
The primary beneficiary of the partner's lien today is the
operator. Not only does the lien provide him a mechanism to
gain priority over other claimants, but it affords him relief
which, in the opinion of the author, is not otherwise available.
For many years in Kentucky, it has been quite common for
operators to assert and file liens against delinquent co-owners
pursuant to KRS section 376.140.2 That statute, however, is
actually a materialman's lien."13 The normal situation is that the
only labor furnished by the operator is a modest amount covered
by his operator's fee. The balance of his expenses is incurred by
os

Paintsville National Bank, 294 S.W. at 1068-69.

Im Id. (Reading the court's findings together, one is hard pressed to imagine a
creditor which in the eyes of the court would be superior to the partner as creditor.).
"o 57 S.W.2d 470 (Ky. 1933).
"I Id. at 472.
H2 KRS § 376.140 (1972).
" Id. (The section applies to "any person who performs labor or furnishes mate").
rials, supplies, fixtures, machinery, or other things of value ....
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virtue of paying the actual suppliers of labor and materials.
Arguably, credit can be considered as within the "other things
of value ' " 4 provision of the statute, but the contention is strained.
Courts from other jurisdictions have pointed out this distinction and, with a surprising degree of consistency, held materialmen's liens unavailable to operators." 5 In In re Cactus
Energy Co., the operator of oil and gas leases filed a statutory
lien to secure payment for costs incurred in operation of the
properties. 1 6 The debtor held a working interest in the leases
pursuant to an operating agreement." 7 The bankruptcy court for
the Western District of Oklahoma held that the filing was not
proper perfection, and thus, could be avoided by the trustee in
bankruptcy."' Prudence dictates that Kentucky operators should
begin claiming their liens not only under KRS section 376.140,
but also under the equitable doctrine." 9
While the filing of a lien asserted solely pursuant to the
equitable doctrine is not a necessity, it is a practical move. The
most often cited reason for this is that the purchaser of production will not suspend payments to the delinquent owner until
such a lien is filed. There are, however, sound legal reasons
behind this practice. The long-standing, though rarely acknowledged, rule is that a lien cannot be enforced against the proceeds
of production once a division order has been entered into by the
partners. 120 The reason for this rule is that the execution of the
division order constitutes an agreement among the partners that
the oil and the proceeds therefrom no longer be treated as
partnership property:
Such liens on the oil itself in favor of the members only exist
while it is the property of the firm. When it is separated or
divided by division or sale, and any part of the oil is set apart
to the individual members of the firm as their distinct part or

ItId.

Gaudreau v. Smith, 21 P.2d 330 (Kan. 1933); Kinne v. Duncan, 43 N.E.2d 425
(Ill. App. 1942); Uncle Sam Oil Co. v. Richards, 158 P. 1187 (Okla. 1916).
116 In re Cactus Energy Co., 45 Bankr 294 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1985).
M" Id.
I

Id. at 295.

See supra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
1 Harris v. Young, 131 N.E. 670, 673 (Il1. 1921).
"9
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share, or such oil is sold and the proceeds divided among the
individual members of the firm, no lien further exists either
on the oil thus separated 21and divided or on the proceeds of
that so sold and divided.'
In order to assert and enforce the lien claim against the proceeds
of production, the claimant must serve some notice to the purchaser of production that he no longer consents to the particular
division order then in effect. ,22 It has been held that delivery of
a copy of the lien to the purchaser will serve to allow enforcement of the lien against the oil or proceeds therefrom from the
23
date of service forward.
One of the recurring problems between operators and investors concerns the fee of the operator. When production declines
non-operators often decline to pay and operators have all too
often relied on what is being charged by other operators in the
vicinity to substantiate their claim of entitlement. Application
of the mining partnership doctrine will solve those disputes, since
the doctrine has a very clear and concise approach to this issue.
The rule is that if the operator is to make a profit from his
124
operating activity it must be agreed on between the partners.
Mining partners have a fiduciary duty to each other and cannot,
absent agreement, charge for more than their actual out-ofpocket expense.121- This rule has specifically been applied to an
operator's supervision fee. 26 The lien will extend, however, to
non-cash valuable disbursements, such as credit earned from
27
suppliers. 1
Finally, what position does a successor partner occupy with
regard to the lien? As pointed out earlier, one of the distinctive
,z'Id.

See Kinne v. Duncan, 43 N.E.2d 425, 431 (Ill. 1942).
See id. (The court suggests the lien be limited specifically to "all oil entering
.
the pipe lines of the pipe line company and the proceeds received therefrom ..
11 Chapman v. Millemon, 361 N.E.2d 1385, 1389 (Ill. 1977).
25 See id. at 1389-90. The operator can charge for the value of services rendered,
as well as for expenses, because if the operator had not performed the services, the
partnership would have had to pay a third party to perform them. But the operator
cannot charge for profit on either services or expenses. Accord Kinne, 43 N.E.2d at
429.
.2 Kinne, 43 N.E.2d at 425-33.
2 "Credit earned" means credits applied by a supplier on the account due and
2

123

owing.
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features of mining partnerships is the free alienability of the
interest. 28 While a partner who incurs the debt is personally
liable for any deficiency, his successor is not. 29 The successor
acquires the ownership interest subject to the lien but has no
personal liability thereon. 30
Disputes over the manner in which the mineral property
should be managed, including the amount of the operator's
supervision fee, have become all too common in recent years. It
has been customary, particularly in western Kentucky, to settle
such disputes by seeking a sale of the entire leasehold working
interest 3 ' on the grounds of indivisibility pursuant to KRS section 389A.030. 32 The theory behind such course of action is that
an interest in minerals constitutes real estate which is inherently
indivisible.' Oil and gas leases have specifically been held subject to the statute, allowing a forced sale of indivisible real
estate. 34 Many forced sales of the entire working interest have
been approved by the courts either on agreement of the working
interest owners or on default of any non-consenting workinginterest owners.
The law as to a forced sale of partnership property, however,
is contrary to this practice. The key case, Outram v. Hudson,"'
held that members of a mining partnership could not seek a sale
of the partnership's leasehold interest on grounds of indivisibil36
ity. The same rule has been recognized in other jurisdictions.
Hudson has often been misinterpreted as prohibiting any invol-

"I See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. See generally 4 W. SUMMERS, THE
LAW OF On. AND GAS §§ 721.1, 725 (1962); 4 AMEmCAN LAW OF MtQNo § 22.30 (1982).
INSee 2 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 435.1, at 505 (1986).
130

Id.

"I'The

term "working interest" means the entire cost-bearing leasehold interest.
KRS § 389A.030 (1984) provides for the bringing of an action for the sale or
division of property by any co-owner of an interest in land.
"I Under the statute, the real estate is presumed to be indivisible unless evidence
can establish that a division can be made "without materially impairing the value of
any interest therein ....
.. Id.; see, e.g., Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Cassady, 98
S.W.2d 495, 496 (Ky. 1936) (the nature of oil and gas deposits preclude the possibility
of fairly dividing the property with any confidence); Laws v. Sturgill, 151 S.W.2d 423,
425 (Ky. 1941).
134 Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Wiedemann Oil Co., 277 S.W. 323, 332 (Ky. 1925).
"3 290 S.W. 1031 (Ky. 1927).
3 Blackmarr v. Williamson, 50 S.E. 254 (W. Va. 1930).
132

1987]

MINING PARTNERSHIPS

untary sale of a leasehold working interest. 3 7 On the contrary,
the case simply stands for the proposition that a mining partnership must be dissolved in the same manner as any other
partnership. 3 This point was underscored in Collins v. Outram,139 in which the court pointed out that the party seeking an
involuntary sale could file a separate action seeking a dissolution
of the partnership. This distinction is currently of great significance because Kentucky has adopted the Uniform Partnership
Act [UPA] which would allow dissolution and if appropriate, a
sale of the assets under several circumstances, including "other
circumstances render[ing] a dissolution necessary."' 4°
The UPA's language can, of course, be read to allow a sale
in almost any set of circumstances, and this is as it should be.
No one should ever have to remain a partner with a person with
whom they simply cannot get along. Dissolution and asset sale
should be readily available in the case of a mining partnership
where the interests of the partners are freely alienable. There is
nothing unfair about an open sale at which anyone can bid.
Such a sale should insure a fair price for all concerned and will
definitely resolve whatever disputes have arisen between the owners. The logic of this position has been acknowledged by the
4
courts of other states.' '

A contrary result would place a minority partner at the mercy
of the majority. This is not a desirable result given the nature
of the enterprise. Unlike corporations, it is almost certain that
the minority partner will be called upon to make periodic cona
tributions of capital in the form of operating expenses. Since 42
partnership,
the
control
can
holders
interest
the
of
majority
the minority is left in danger of seeing their monthly expenses
increased dramatically. The only recourse for the minority is to
seek a sale of the partnership assets.

"
338

McCool v. O'Brien, 160 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Ky. 1942).
4 AMmjCAN LAW OF MINING, supra note 128 at § 22.46; 3 C.

LINDLEY, LINDLEY

ON MINES 803 (3d ed. 1914).

32 S.W.2d 722 (Ky. 1930).
KRS § 362.305 (Supp. 1986).
141 See e.g., Home-Stake Prod. Co. v. Tri-State Pipe Co., 415 P.2d 377, 381-82
(Kan. 1966) (sale allowed on a finding that no partnership existed); Browne v. Loriaux,
366 P.2d 1016 (Kan. 1961) (partnership's operation could not be carried on sensibly any
longer).
142 Stephens, 237 S.W.2d at 74.
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CONCLUSION

Mining partnerships are and will always be a legal fiction. Legal fictions serve a purpose, that being to provide a
logical framework within which to evaluate and adjudicate legal
disputes that arise. They provide the legitimacy on which a body
of law is constructed.
In recent years the court and the bar have lost touch with
the roots of the law governing the relationships among individuals involved directly or indirectly in the development and operation of mineral estates. As a result, there is a great deal of
uncertainty about how to approach, analyze, and resolve specific
disputes concerning such operations. This article has attempted
to demonstrate that the theory of mining partnerships can provide an effective means of analyzing and resolving the many
disputes that are common in the field of mineral development,
particularly in an era of economic contraction for the industry.
The two areas of dispute that are most frequently litigated
are creditor claims and owner conflicts. The cases involving
creditor disputes always directly confront the issue of who must
absorb a business loss. The position advocated by the author is
to resolve these disputes on the basis of imposing several but
not joint liability on non-operator investors to outside suppliers.
Operators are liable for the entire indebtedness to the supplier
by virtue of having contracted directly with the supplier for the
entire obligation. This conclusion was reached by balancing the
competing interests of the creditor and the investor. In most
cases, both sides are innocent. The creditor has provided materials or services to the development and is entitled to payment.
The investor, on the other hand, has provided a portion of the
capital and is normally unaware that for whatever reason the
operator has not delivered on his cost projections. A rule imposing joint and several liability on investors will only serve to
discourage such investment and a rule holding investors harmless
from liability will discourage the extension of credit for mineral
development.
Mining partnerships possess many of the traits of commercial
partnerships. The theory has long recognized that mining partners can only bind each other for the necessary expenses of the
development. That framework is still sound. It should simply be
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adjusted to reflect the greater use of turn-key contracts with
investors by establishing the severed liability rule set forth herein.
When the theory of mining partnership is employed in the
owner-operator context it provides a means of balancing their
competing interests. The operator's concern is in being paid by
the owners for the expense of the operation. The owner, on the
other hand, wants to know that all charges are fair and necessary
and that the operation is proceeding in a sensible fashion. If all
owners and operators committed their agreements on these matters to writing there would be no need for the theory in this
area. All too often, however, there is no written agreement or,
at best, the writing did not anticipate all contingencies.
One of the unique aspects of the mining partnership is the
existence of a lien to secure all the monies advanced by a partner
for partnership use. Not only can the operator be secured on
his expenses but other partners can rest assured that all the
owners will share in the cost of production.
The most common complaint on the part of owners is that
operators charge too much for supervision. Once again equities
exist on each side. The theory, however, makes it clear that in
the absence of a specific agreement to the contrary the operator
is entitled to recover his expenses but no profit. In the absence
of the mining partnership framework there is no definitive way
to resolve this dispute.
The legal fiction of mining partnerships is still viable. When
properly applied it will provide the means to resolve the thorniest
of mineral development issues even in the 1980's.

